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Abstract. Attitudes toward risk underlie virtually every important 
economic decision an individual makes. In this experimental study, I 
examine how introducing a time delay into the execution of an investment 
plan influences individuals’ risk preferences. The field experiment 
proceeded in three stages: a decision stage, an execution stage and a payout 
stage. At the outset, in the Decision Stage (Stage 1), each subject was asked 
to make an investment plan by splitting a monetary investment amount 
between a risky asset and a safe asset. Subjects were informed that the 
investment plans they made in the Decision Stage are binding and will be 
executed during the Execution Stage (Stage 2). The Payout Stage (Stage 3) 
was the payout date. The timing of the Decision Stage and Payout Stage 
was the same for each subject, but the timing of the Execution Stage varied 
experimentally. I find that individuals who were assigned to execute their 
investment plans later (i.e., for whom there was a greater delay prior to the 
Execution Stage) invested a greater amount in the risky asset during the 
Decision Stage (JEL D03, D81, D91, OI10, O12, O16) 
 
Keywords: life- risk and time, risk preferences, reference-dependent utility 
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1. Introduction 
Attitudes toward risk underlie virtually every important economic decision an individual 
makes. They influence whether one engages in negative health behaviors (Anderson and Mellor 
2008), what level of education to pursue (Belzil and Leonardi 2007), what type of employment to 
seek (Sapienza et al. 2009), when to marry (Spivey 2010), and how many children to have 
(Rodriguez and Seigle 2012). In addition, previous studies have found that individuals who exhibit 
higher levels of risk aversion, that is, the tendency to avoid better-than-fair gambles, also tend to 
exhibit higher levels of impatience or time discounting, which is the rate at which future costs and 
benefits are adjusted to make them comparable with current ones (Weber and Chapman 2005). In 
this study, I use data from a simple randomized artefactual intervention1 conducted in Tanzania to 
examine how introducing a time delay into the execution of an investment plan influences 
individuals’ risk preferences. 
We recruited a sample of 350 participants in Morogoro, Tanzania for an experiment that 
proceeded in three stages. At the outset, in the Decision Stage (Stage 1), each subject was asked 
to make an investment plan by splitting a monetary investment amount (I) between a risky asset 
(R) and a safe asset (I-R). The risky asset had a 50 percent chance of returning five times the 
amount invested (5R) and a 50 percent chance of returning nothing. The safe asset only returned 
the amount invested (I-R). Subjects were informed that the investment plans they made in the 
Decision Stage could not be changed during the Execution Stage (Stage 2). During the Decision 
Stage, subjects were informed that they would receive the money (I) to execute their Decision 
Stage plan during the Execution Stage, and were told when the Execution Stage would occur (i.e., 
the duration of the delay). The study team provided the money that was used during the Execution 
Stage, but reclaimed it upon completion of the Execution Stage. We informed individuals that the 
money each person placed in the “savings” cup (safe asset) would be stored there until the last 
session of the game, at which time they would recoup all the money they had deposited in the 
savings cup. Finally, the Payout Stage (Stage 3) was the payout date. Subjects returned and were 
informed, based on a flip of a coin, whether their risky asset was successful or not. The timing of 
the Decision Stage and Payout Stage was the same for each subject, but the timing of the Execution 
Stage varied experimentally. I then examined how the timing of the Execution Stage influenced 
individuals' allocation of their initial funds to risky assets (R) during the Decision Stage. 
  I find that individuals who were assigned to execute their investment plans later (i.e., for 
whom there was a greater delay prior to the Execution Stage) invested a greater amount in the risky 
asset during the Decision Stage. On average, subjects across all treatment groups allocated 67 
percent of their initial endowment to the risky asset and 33 percent to the safe asset. Each one-
week delay in the Execution Stage increased the amount allocated to the risky asset in the Decision 
Stage by, on average, 57 Tanzanian shillings (TZS) (approximately 0.05 USD), which was 
approximately 3 percent of the initial endowment. Cumulatively, a four-week delay in the 
execution of an investment plan resulted in approximately 11 percent more of the endowment 
being invested in the risky asset. 
After establishing that a time delay has a positive influence on one’s willingness to invest 
in a risky asset, I examined the theoretical explanations of this empirical result. Although 
inconsistent with the results of a standard economic model on intertemporal decision-making, this 
result is consistent with a reference-dependent framework that incorporates a reference point 
(affected via temporal priming) within an individual’s intertemporal decision-making process. I 
then developed a simple stylized model that explains how an increase in the lag between the time 
 
1 Based on the taxonomy presented in Harrison and List (2004).  
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at which an investment plan is made and the time when that investment plan is executed increases 
the amount an individual invests in a risky asset rather than a safe asset. 
Although recent studies have examined violations of expected utility theory2 (e.g., when 
rational individuals respond to a cognitive bias that makes them choose differently depending on 
whether a prospect is presented as a loss or a gain), the studies that are most closely related to the 
current study are those of Noussair and Wu (2006) and Shelley (1994), who examine the stability 
of risk preferences and individual discount rates, respectively. Noussair and Wu (2006) explore 
the stability of risk preferences between lotteries that are resolved and paid immediately versus 
those that are resolved and paid in the future and find that subjects exhibit a greater level of risk 
aversion toward lotteries that are resolved and paid immediately. Unlike the current study’s setup, 
Noussair and Wu (2006) vary both the lottery choice and the payout date. Shelley (1994) examines 
how individuals discount risky lotteries and finds that depending on whether the payoffs are in 
terms of gains or losses, lotteries consisting exclusively of losses are discounted more heavily.3 
Although classical economic models posit that individual preferences are stable across time 
and contexts, recent studies on endogenous preferences have challenged this assumption and 
argued that contextual factors, such as priming, can shape individual preferences. Priming, a 
concept that was first developed in the field of psychology (Meyer and Schvaneveldt 1971, Neeley 
1977, Tulving and and Murray 1985, Dehaene et al. 2006, Bargh and Chartrand 2000, Doyen et 
al. 2012), refers to the activation of mental concepts through subtle situational cues or stimuli that 
can influence one’s judgment and behavior as a result of prior encounters with the same or related 
stimuli.4 Priming has recently also become the focus of economic studies, especially in the context 
of how situational cues influence one’s economic decision-making.5 For example, Lichand and 
Mani (2016) examine how exogenous shocks, in the form of weather shocks, can decrease an 
individual’s attention, memory, and impulse control and increase their susceptibility to a variety 
of behavioral biases.6 In the study setup presented here, the information regarding the timing of 
 
2 A related set of recent studies focuses on testing expected utility theory more broadly, in particular on the 
independence axiom in intertemporal dimensions (the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect). Baucells and 
Heukamp (2009), Gneezy, List and Wu (2006), and Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) examine behavior related to the 
common ratio effect. Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006) document a violation of this condition in which individuals value 
a risky prospect less than its worst possible realization. Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) show that subjects violate 
predictions of the common ratio effect in intertemporal contexts. 
3 Within the economics literature, Anderhub et al. (2001), Anderson and Stafford (2009) and Epper, Fehr-Duda, and 
Bruhin (2009) explore various channels for how people's risk-taking behavior is interlinked with their time 
discounting. 
4 Based on the type, priming can occur via the speed of processing (Reisberg 2007), via items of a similar form or 
meaning (Biederman and Cooper 1992), via exposure repetition (Forster and Davis 1984), via items sharing similar 
semantic features (Ferrand and New 2003), or via stimuli that trigger visuomotor system effects (Klotz and Wolff 
1995). In addition, priming has been shown to influence subsequent behavior in the context of various stimuli: 
visual, spatial, physical, olfactory, and verbal cues (Kay et al. 2004, Biederman and Cooper 1992), and most 
recently temporal stimuli (Trope and Liberman 2000, Huber et al. 2002, Blandin and Dehaene 2002, Fujita et al. 
2006, Kivetz and Tyler 2007, Ebert and Prelec 2007, Mannetti et al. 2009, Naccache, Zauberman et al. 2009, Yashar 
and Lami 2010, Bauer, Muller and Usher 2009). 
5 For recent economic studies that explicitly consider priming in individual decision-making, see Matthey (2010), 
Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2010), and Cohn et al. (2015). 
6Shah, Shafir, and Mullainathan (2015) document various recent behavioral biases, including priming, in the context 
of economic decision-making. 
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the Execution Stage serves as a form of temporal priming.7 This information likely increases the 
salience of the present in a subject’s mind. 
 This study makes two important contributions to the economics literature. First, it provides 
evidence that temporal priming can influence individual behavior in the context of important 
economic outcomes (e.g., investment decisions) by showing that it can induce individuals to 
choose a more risky option. Knowing which factors can induce individuals to take on more risk 
can be useful in various policy contexts. Previous economic studies have largely focused on 
conceptual priming and its influence on behavior and how social identity shapes one’s preferences 
(Cohn and Marechal 2016), whereas this study focuses on whether temporal priming can influence 
one’s behavior.8 Second, this study provides evidence of time inconsistency in the domain of 
investment behavior. This differs from recent experimental studies on individual time 
inconsistency that have largely examined behavior in the consumption domain (e.g., Ashraf, 
Karlan and Yin 2006).9 In contrast, this paper provides evidence of time inconsistency in the 
context of investment decision-making. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model 
and testable predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental design, data, and study sample. 
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 presents a theoretical explanation of the empirical findings 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A Simple Framework with a Delay in Investment Execution 
I outline a simple, classical decision-making framework to highlight a key prediction 
regarding this study’s experimental design. Let us assume that an individual faces a timeline with 
three time points: t0 (investment plan creation), t1 (pre-made investment plan execution), and t2 
(investment payout). At t0, the individual makes a plan involving the spread of investment of a 
fixed monetary endowment between two assets: a risky asset and a safe asset. There are two states 
of the world to consider: good (G) and not good (NG). An individual chooses between two 
gambles, A and B, where: 
 = (,  , 	, 	  ) and  = ( ,  , 	 , 	  ) 
where pGi is the probability of state G, pNGi is the probability of state NG, cGi is the payout in state 
G, cNGi is the payout in state NG, and i = A, B. These gambles have the following expected utilities: 
 =  × 	 +  × 	   and   =  × 	 +  × 	  
A is associated with payouts (	, 	 ) and B is associated with payouts (	 , 	 ), with all 
payouts occurring at t2. A time-consistent individual, whose preferences satisfy the completeness, 
transitivity, continuity, and independence axioms, will make a choice at t0 by comparing the 
expected utilities associated with the two gambles. He or she will choose A over B if and only if, 
 > . From a neo-classical standpoint, the timing of t1 does not factor into the comparison 
between the two gambles. In other words, the amount invested in the riskier gamble should not 
vary with the timing of t1. In a standard intertemporal model, an individual chooses between A and 
B by comparing EUA with EUB discounted from the perspective of time point t0. For a time-
 
7 Several recent studies rely on cues related to temporal stimuli. See, e.g., Trope and Liberman (2000), Fujita et al. 
(2006), Kivetz and Tyler (2007), Ebert and Prelec (2007), Zauberman et al. (2009), Yashar and Lami (2010), and 
Bauer, Muller, and Usher (2009). 
8 Bargh and Chartrand (2000) and Jin (2015, pp. 16–60) discuss psychology studies that examine the role of various 
forms of priming.  
9 I also provide evidence of one way to influence reference point creation: visceral possession versus expectations 
(i.e., the Köszegi and Rabin model). 
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consistent individual, ceteris paribus, the timing of t1  (at which point one makes an investment 
based on a pre-existing and binding investment plan) does not influence one’s decision, made at 
time point t0, to split an amount of money I between various gambles. This study sets up an 
experimental design to test this prediction. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1  Experimental Setup 
We recruited 350 subjects, all of whom were over 18 years of age, from catchment areas 
with the help of village and district leaders in Morogoro, Tanzania. We directly invited all 
individuals to participate in our study over a period of four weeks (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Summary of Treatment Groups 
 Treatment 
Group 1 
Treatment 
Group 2 
Treatment 
Group 3 
Treatment 
Group 4 
Treatment 
Group 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Endowment  2,000 TZS 2,000 TZS 2,000 TZS 2,000 TZS 2,000 TZS 
Sample Size 70 70 70 70 70 
Delay (in weeks) to 
Execution Stage 
(t1) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Notes: At the time of the study, 1 U.S. dollar was approximately equivalent to 1,570 Tanzanian schillings (TZS). 
 
Each individual in our three-stage study faced two investment choices: one was a risky asset 
(A), offering a high mean and variance, while the other was a safe asset (B). A had a 50 percent 
chance of returning five times the amount invested (R) and a 50 percent chance of returning 
nothing. B paid out the amount invested in it (i.e., the difference between the original money 
endowment (I) and R, or I-R). There were five groups of investors, and each group was assigned a 
different time for the execution of their investment plans (see Figure 1).  
 The Decision Stage (t0): During this stage, each subject made a plan regarding the investment 
of 2,000 Tanzanian shillings (TZS) (approximately 1.3 USD). The investment was to be spread 
between A and B. The subjects knew how long they would have to wait until execution (i.e., 
they were advised when the execution would occur) when they made their investment plans. 
 The Execution Stage (t1): During this stage, individuals were given the cash that was promised 
in the Decision Stage (I) and told to invest it in accordance with the investment plan made in 
the Decision Stage.10 
 The Payout Stage (t2): During this stage, the outcomes of lotteries chosen at t0 were revealed 
(based on a flip of a coin, the risky asset was deemed either successful or otherwise), and each 
individual received his or her payout. 
 
10 The money used during the Execution Stage was reclaimed upon completion of the Execution Stage to avoid the 
possibility of an endowment effect. We informed individuals that the money each person placed in the “savings” cup 
(safe asset) would be stored safely there until the last session of the game, at which point they would receive all of 
the money deposited in the “savings” cup. 
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Figure 1—Stylized Timeline of the Study Design 
 
The main objective of this experimental design was to randomly assign the timing of the 
Execution Stage. We randomly varied the timing of the Execution Stage to occur at weekly 
intervals between one and four weeks after the Decision Stage, and examined how, ceteris paribus, 
the portion of I that was invested in the risky asset A varied with the timing of the Execution Stage.  
Each participant was given the following basic instructions in Swahili (see Appendix B for 
the detailed instructions): 
This game consists of three sessions. The first session will take place today. The second session will take 
place in this same venue on ____. The third session will occur in four weeks. It is very important that you 
attend all three sessions. We will give you a letter reminding you of the dates of the second and third sessions. 
In the first session of the game that will take place today, we will ask you to make an investment plan for a 
sum of money we will give you in <xx> weeks’ time during the second session. You will have to decide 
today how to invest this money in <xx> weeks’ time. At that time, you will divide the money between two 
account cups, a “savings” cup and a “business” cup, based on the investment plan you make today. The 
money that you decide to place in the business cup in <xx> weeks’ time can generate a greater return than 
money placed into the savings cup; however, there is the possibility of no gain.  The money that you decide 
today to place in the saving” cup in <xx> weeks as well as the money that you place in the business cup will 
be stored and given to you at the end of the third session. Now, we will explain the step-by-step details of the 
game. 
As can be seen, during the Decision Stage, subjects were alerted to the specific timing of 
the Execution Stage. As discussed earlier, it is entirely possible that the specification of the timing 
of the Execution Stage increased its salience, and that some subjects were primed to think of short 
timeframes. During the Decision Stage and the Execution Stage, we used the term “cup” to refer 
to each hypothetical asset (i.e., a “business” cup and a “savings” cup).11  
3.2  Data and Sample Characteristics 
We used two sources of data. The first source was our background survey, which included 
questions on the baseline characteristics of the participants, such as marital status, household 
composition, assets, and health (the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2). The second 
source of data elicited time and risk preferences from respondents (see Figure A2) and measured 
 
11 The money an individual decided to place in the business cup could be used to generate more money—like a 
business. During the Execution Stage, the study team visited the subjects, reminded them of the investment plans 
they had made during the Decision Stage, and confirmed that the plans were binding. Subjects were also reminded 
that investments placed in the business cup could either succeed or fail. Therefore, if the “business” succeeded, they 
would earn a return on the amount they had placed in the business cup. However, if the “business” failed, they 
would receive nothing from the “business” venture. After being provided with this information, subjects were asked 
to execute their Decision Stage plans by physically depositing the money that was handed to them into the 
appropriate cup or cups. 
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cognitive ability. The time-preference questions asked respondents to decide between receiving 
TZS 5,450 (approximately 3 USD) now and a larger amount a month later. To measure time 
consistency, we also asked respondents to choose between receiving TZS 5,450 in one month’s 
time or a larger amount in two months’ time. The risk-preference questions were similar to those 
of Charness and Genicot (2009), and asked respondents how much of an initial amount of TZS 
1,800 (approximately 1.2 USD) they would like to invest in an asset that would return either four 
times the amount invested or nothing with probability 0.5 (see Figure A1). To measure cognitive 
ability, we asked respondents to complete a Raven’s Progressive Matrices test, in which they had 
to recognize patterns in a series of images. This cognitive assessment generated a score between 
zero and eight. 
The study sample came from the Morogoro area, and no study participants were part of 
any other study at the time. Although we did not collect information on occupation, the majority 
of the study participants were engaged in the informal agricultural sector. The summary statistics 
in Table 2 show that the sample was divided approximately evenly between males and females, 
the average age of study participants was 36 years, approximately 18 percent of the study sample 
had completed primary education or above, and approximately half were married at the time of the 
study. Study participants had earned an average of 157,296 TZS (approximately 100 US dollars) 
in the month prior to the study and the mean number of children in their households was slightly 
more than two.   
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Sample Subjects  
 Mean (SD) 
Demographics  
Age 36.44 (13.61) 
Male (1=male, 0=female) 0.48 (0.50) 
Completed more than primary (yes=1, no=0) 0.18 (0.38) 
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 0.49 (0.50) 
Number of children in household 2.32 (2.08) 
Earnings last month (in TZS) 157,296.43 (250,730.11) 
Number of chickens (Assets) 4.85 (10.99) 
Metal roof (1=yes, 0=no)  0.80 (0.39) 
Risk and Time Preferences  
Amount invested (out of 1800 TZS) in risky asset 1,260.07 (430.60) 
Somewhat patient 0.15 (0.36) 
Time-consistent 0.25 (0.43) 
Present-biased 0.37 (0.48) 
More patient in future than in present 0.18 (0.39) 
Cognitive Skills  
Ravens ability test (# correct out of eight questions)  3.26 (2.08) 
  
Observations 350 
Notes: Standard deviations presented in parentheses. At the time of the study, 1 U.S. dollar was approximately equivalent 
to 1,570 Tanzanian schillings (TZS). The risky asset paid off five times the amount invested with probability 0.5, and 0 
with probability 0.5. Risk Preference Module is in Appendix Figures. “Somewhat Patient” is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the respondent prefers TZS 5,650 (or less) in a month to TZS 5,450 now (Time Module is in Appendix Figures), and 0 
otherwise. “Time-Consistent” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent exhibits the same discount rate between 
today and one month from today, and 0 otherwise. “Present-Biased” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent 
exhibits a higher discount rate between today and one month from today than between one month from today and two 
months from today, and 0 otherwise. “More Patient in Future than in Present” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent will be more patient in one month than they are today, and 0 otherwise.  
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Using data from the demographic variables, I verified that no correlation existed between 
individual characteristics and the five randomly assigned treatment groups (see Table 3). Using 
two statistical tests regarding equality of means across treatment groups, I found that none of the 
variables exhibited statistical significance. This pattern is consistent with the successful 
implementation of random assignment.   
Of the initial study sample, 335 participants (95 percent) completed the experiment. There 
were two main sources of attrition. Some participants could not be found at the time of the 
Execution Stage, and several participants failed to appear at the Payout Stage. The results presented 
in Table A2 in the Appendix show that there was no statistical evidence that attrition status was 
correlated with treatment group. 
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Table 3: Average Subject Sample Characteristics 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
p-value 
joint test 
1 
p-value 
joint test 
2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age 36.20 
(12.29) 
34.40 
(13.00) 
36.34 
(12.73) 
37.71 
(15.01) 
37.74 
(15.09) 
0.66 0.88 
Male (1=yes, 0=no) 0.44  
(0.50) 
0.55  
(0.50) 
0.49  
(0.50) 
0.52  
(0.50) 
0.39  
(0.49) 
0.27 0.49 
More than primary 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.13  
(0.34) 
0.39  
(0.49) 
0.19  
(0.39) 
0.10  
(0.30) 
0.11  
(0.32) 
0.23 0.19 
Married (1=yes, 0=no) 0.46  
(0.50) 
0.41  
(0.50) 
0.56  
(0.50) 
0.58  
(0.49) 
0.49  
(0.50) 
0.23 0.42 
Children in household 
(Number) 
2.63 
(1.84) 
1.65 
(1.91) 
2.31 
(2.49) 
2.49 
(2.49) 
2.57 
(2.34) 
0.11 0.25 
Monthly earnings (in 
TZS) 
146,157.89 
(195,079.82) 
139,373.08 
(198,253.35) 
165,458.33 
(292,477.46) 
125,547.62 
(182,327.53) 
209,500.00 
(342,224.70) 
0.57 0.76 
Chickens (Number) 7.12  
(14.28) 
5.48  
(9.90) 
4.93  
(12.98) 
4.73  
(11.25) 
2.55  
(5.39) 
0.33 0.13 
Metal roof (1=yes, 0=no) 0.77  
(0.43) 
0.83  
(0.38) 
0.80  
(0.41) 
0.85  
(0.36) 
0.79  
(0.41) 
0.80 0.44 
Risk aversion 1244 
(443.96) 
1331 
(446.81) 
1327 
(403.37) 
1222 
(434.20) 
1160 
(413.27) 
0.15 0.79 
Somewhat patient 0.08 (0.28) 0.17 (0.38) 0.21 (0.41) 0.16 (0.37) 0.13 (0.13) 0.39 0.13 
Time-consistent 0.24 (0.43) 0.20 (0.41) 0.33 (0.47) 0.29 (0.46) 0.21 (0.41) 0.49 0.85 
Present-biased 0.31 (0.47) 0.36 (0.48) 0.34 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.44 (0.50) 0.52 0.25 
More patient in future 
than in present 
0.18 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.16 (0.37) 0.98 0.95 
Raven’s test (number 
correct)  
2.87  
(2.36) 
3.68  
(1.84) 
3.37  
(1.97) 
3.17  
(2.03) 
3.15  
(2.18) 
0.21 0.13 
        
Observations 70 70 70 70 70   
Notes: Standard deviations presented in parentheses. At the time of the study, 1 U.S. dollar was approximately equivalent to 1,570 Tanzanian schillings (TZS). 
Joint test 1: Test of equality of means across four treatment groups (i.e., complete null hypothesis).  
Joint test 2: Joint test that means in treatment groups (Groups 2-5) are equal to mean in control group (Group 1). 
 
 
 
 
4. Results: Intent-to-Treat Analysis  
4.1 Intent-to-Treat Effect: Impact on Investment in Risky Assets 
The main outcome of interest, and thus our dependent variable, is the amount invested in 
the risky asset (Y). Let us assume that ZG2 is an indicator variable for assignment to Treatment 
Group 2, which is allowed to execute its investment plan one week after the plan is made, ZG3 is 
an indicator variable for assignment to Treatment Group 3, which is allowed to execute its 
investment plan two weeks after the plan is made, ZG4 is an indicator variable for assignment to 
Treatment Group 4, which is allowed to execute its investment plan three weeks after the plan is 
made, and ZG5 is an indicator variable for assignment to Treatment Group 5, which cannot execute 
its investment plan until four weeks after the plan is made. I estimate the following equation for 
the full sample: 
 = β + β + β, + β, + β, + β, +       (1) 
where Xi is a vector of additional controls and βG2, βG3, βG4, and βG5 are coefficients that capture 
the causal effect of treatment group assignment to Groups 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, relative to 
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the control group (Treatment Group 1). Individuals in the control group (Treatment Group 1) 
execute their investment plan without delay. βG2 provides an estimate for the intent-to-treat (ITT) 
effect—an average of the causal effects—for an individual who is assigned to execute his 
investment plan after a one-week delay and so on for βG3 (a two-week delay), βG4 (a three-week 
delay), and βG5 (a four-week delay). Table 4 presents the results, clustered at the session level, for 
the experimental subjects’ investment behavior by treatment group (the reference group is 
Treatment Group 1).  
Table 4: Intent-to-Treat Analysis of Investment in Risky Asset 
 Amount in Risky 
Asset 
Amount in Risky 
Asset  
 (1) (2) 
Treatment Group 2 127.88*** 109.96*** 
 (44.78) (31.51) 
Treatment Group 3 171.34*** 147.65*** 
 (38.34) (25.56) 
Treatment Group 4 214.60*** 184.10*** 
 (65.70) (62.56) 
Treatment Group 5 268.02*** 225.98*** 
 (40.50) (45.86) 
   
Mean Dep Variable 1329 1329 
Covariates No Yes 
Observations 350 350 
R2 0.11 0.13 
Notes: All results are in reference to Group 1. Standard errors in clustered at the session level. At the time 
of the study, 1 U.S. dollar was approximately equivalent to 1,570 Tanzanian schillings (TZS). Controls 
include gender, age, marital status, number of children, asset proxies, risk aversion measurement, time 
preferences, Raven’s test total score. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
Overall, Table 4 provides strong evidence that as the delay until execution increases, 
subjects display a greater willingness to invest more of their monetary endowment in the risky 
asset. Ceteris paribus, a one-week delay prior to execution of the investment plan results in an 
increase of 57 TZS (approximately 0.05 USD), or approximately 3 percent, of each subject’s initial 
endowment in the amount invested in the risky asset. Thus, a four-week delay prior to execution 
of the investment plan results in approximately 11 percent more of the initial endowment being 
invested in the risky asset. 
4.2 Quantile Treatment Effects 
Estimation of the quantile treatment effects shows the distribution of impacts and avoids 
the possibility of drawing misleading conclusions based on outliers. Table A3 shows regressions, 
clustered at the session level, for quintiles of the distribution. The estimated treatment effect at the 
tenth percentile may be interpreted as the difference in balance changes between two individuals—
one in the treatment group and the other in the control group (i.e., Group 1) —positioned at the 
tenth percentile of the distribution of changes within their respective groups. Comparing the 
treatment group with the control group, the largest treatment effects are at the top of the 
distribution.  
4.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Next, I examined differential impacts in relation to several demographic and behavioral 
characteristics. Table 5 shows the results of the same regressions (clustered at the session level) 
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shown in Table 3, but with the treatment indicator variable interacted with one demographic or 
behavioral variable at a time. The demographic and behavioral variables included gender, 
education, earnings, and cognitive skills. The coefficient for the interaction term is insignificant 
for all variables. This suggests that within the treatment group, the average effect of the 
treatment assignment is operating uniformly across these other characteristics.  
 
Table 5: Intent-to-Treat Analysis of Subgroups. Investment in Risky Asset 
 Amount in 
Risky Asset 
Amount in 
Risky Asset  
Amount in 
Risky Asset 
Amount in 
Risky Asset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment Group 5 189.99*** 
(78.29) 
247.71*** 
(48.08) 
154.58*** 
(60.84) 
122.55** 
(77.30) 
Male -30.03 (83.46)    
Male × Treatment Group 5 28.93 (118.51)    
Primary completed  60.65 (71.58)   
Primary completed × 
Treatment Group 5 
 -215.85 
(146.51) 
  
Earnings   0.00 (0.00)  
Earnings × Treatment 
Group 5 
 
  0.00 (0.00)  
Raven’s cognitive score    8.87 (7.67) 
Raven’s cognitive score × 
Treatment Group 5 
   21.01 (17.27) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
R2 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.38 
Notes: All results are in reference to Group 1. Standard errors in clustered at the session level. At the time of the study, 1 U.S. dollar was 
approximately equivalent to 1,570 Tanzanian schillings (TZS). Controls include gender, age, marital status, number of children, asset proxies, 
risk aversion measurement, time preferences, Raven’s test total score out of eight questions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels. 
 
5. Discussion of Potential Mechanisms: A Stylized Model with Reference-Dependent Risk 
Preferences 
 I present a simple model wherein agents make investment decisions based not on the final 
outcome, but rather on the potential losses and gains from the investment. Each agent determines 
these potential values by evaluating prospective losses and gains using a certain heuristic process 
formed from their own perspective. At t0=0, an individual decides whether to invest or save an 
endowment (I=1) that he or she will receive at t1. The gains from saving and investment are 
realized at t2 subject to the following specifications: 
 Investment: earns k with probability (

) and 0 with probability (

); and 
 Saving: the savings rate is such that the net present value (NPV) of the endowment is 
unaffected. 
 
To find the minimum level of k that induces the agent to invest, I specify a framework 
relating the individual’s decision to t1. The individual’s value function features three 
characteristics. First, it features reference dependence (i.e., the carrier of an attribute’s value is not 
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based on its absolute level, but rather on its deviation from some reference level, which results in 
either a gain or a loss). Second, the value function is steeper for losses than for gains (i.e., a loss 
decreases value more than a gain of equivalent size increases value). Third, I embed diminishing 
sensitivity (i.e., the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their size; the first sip 
of beer tastes the best and the first dollar lost hurts the most). For simplicity, I formulate linear 
utility as follows: 
 
(!|#) = $! − #             &'      ! ≥ #)(! − #)       &'      ! < #+   (2) 
with ) > 1 (typically ) = 2).12 Thus, for reference structures that satisfy constant loss aversion, 
changes in the preference order induced by a shift in a reference point can be described in terms 
of the constant γ, which is the coefficient of loss aversion. 
I assume that the reference point is the discounted endowment value # = 67.13 The 
intuition behind this assumption is that investing money that one has already received, or will soon 
receive, is more likely to bring an individual into the loss domain than investing money that will 
be received in the future. In other words, the further into the future the execution of a planned 
investment is, the more an individual is willing to demote the perception of a “prize” associated 
with carrying out the plan.Time point t1 manipulates, very likely through temporal priming with 
the temporal reminder regarding the timing of t1 (the Execution Stage), the individual’s perception 
of derived gains and derived losses.  
Substituting # = 67 into (3), I get: 
(!|6, 8) = $! − 6
7              &'      ! ≥ 67
)(! − 67)       &'      ! < 67+   (3) 
 
The lottery prospect offers a gain with probability 0.5 (9 = 6:; − 67) and a loss with 
probability 0.5 (9 = −)67). To maximize his or her expected utility, an individual chooses to 
invest if 

 (;6: − 67) −

 )67 > 0. This expression provides us with k (i.e., the investment 
amount) as a function of t1 and δ: 
 
; > (=>)?@7?@: ≡ ;∗   (4) 
Based on (4), our key prediction is that an increase in the lag between the planning and 
execution of an investment increases an individual’s propensity to invest rather than save. The 
intuition behind this prediction is that the reference point for a loss or a gain is lower for delayed 
earnings, and this delay reduces loss aversion.  
6. Conclusion 
Using data from an artefactual experiment, I estimate the causal effects of introducing a 
delay prior to the execution of an investment plan on how individuals allocate monetary 
endowments between a safe and a risky asset. I find a significant positive effect of a time delay on 
the amount individuals are willing to invest in a risky asset, all else being equal. On average, 
subjects across all treatment groups allocated 67 percent of their initial endowment to the risky 
asset and 33 percent to the safe asset. A one-week delay in the execution of the investment plan 
 
12 Empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient are approximately around 2 (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
13 This assumption is supported by Mohr et al. (2010), Tu (2004), Oxoby and Morrison (2010), McAlvanah (2007), 
and Baucells and Heukamp (2009), and is ingrained in the intertemporal version of the Weber–Fechner Law in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and construal-level theory in Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope (2002). 
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induced subjects to allocate 3 percent more of their endowment to the risky asset when planning 
their investment allocation. Cumulatively, a four-week delay in the execution of an investment 
plan resulted in approximately 11 percent more of their endowment being invested in the risky 
asset. 
The findings of this study raise a number of issues concerning the pathways through which 
a time delay influences one’s willingness to invest in riskier assets. Due to this study’s design, I 
cannot rule out alternative explanations of the key result. Thus, future studies should focus on 
identifying the mechanisms driving this empirical result. The results of the study draw attention to 
an empirical finding that may have important implications for human behavior. This finding also 
highlights an area in which the predictions of standard economic models are wide of the mark. A 
detailed examination of how individuals respond to temporal priming cues in the intertemporal 
decision-making model could, in some settings, not only provide better predictions of behavior, 
but also be welfare-enhancing, with potential implications for policy-makers.  
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